We use hourly bid data from the Spanish day-ahead electricity auction to obtain a lower bound measure of generators' market power. Our method is not based on cost estimates but rather on the di¤erent behavior of strategic generators as compared to the behavior of more competitive producers. The results indicate that, despite the price cap e¤ect of regulation in this market, the larger operators in the day-ahead market are able to increase prices above the competitive benchmark by a signi…cant amount.
found that for the British market, prices were much closer to marginal cost than most theories predicted, although she also …nds some evidence of strategic capacity withholding. Explanations for the restrained price levels were …nancial contracts between the suppliers and their customers, 3 threat of entry, and threat of regulatory intervention in the market. 4 In the industrial organization literature several methods have been used to measure market power in electricity markets. Mount (2001) associates systematic patterns of price spikes with market power use in the UK electricity market.
1 Regulated by Act 2019 of December 26, 1997. 2 See Fabra (2001) for an overview of the literature on electricity markets and empirical evidence.
3 See Green (1999) on contracts for di¤erences. 4 However, Newbury (2002) argues that many European countries lack the necessary regulatory power to mitigate generator market power. Spear (2003) argues that horizontal market power explains price spikes in peak periods observed in the California generation market, as well as the reduction in additions to capacity. Several papers (Green (1994), von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) , Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2000) and Wolfram (1999) , among others) have used direct measures of marginal cost to calculate price cost margins. Macatangay (2002) proposes a test of "suspicious patterns" of bidding behavior based on the slopes of the supply curves; he shows that "suspects" behave di¤erently from the rest and checks whether the strategies of the suspect …rms a¤ect one another. Bushnell and Saravia (2002) measure the competitiveness of the New England electricity market by comparing equilibrium prices with a competitive benchmark: an estimate of the price that would result if no …rm exerted market power. They obtain a demand-weighted markup from 4% to 12% depending on whether equilibrium prices include operating constraints or not.
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Our approach is di¤erent from previous work measuring the impact of market power in that we do not use cost estimates. Rather, we study the actual behavior at the electricity auction of …rms with high market share and compare it to that of small …rms. 6 The bid of a large operator at the pool is obtained by aggregating the bid schedules of each generating plant under its control. In the absence of any market power (that is, in the competitive benchmark), a generating plant would bid at the pool independently of whether it belongs to a large operator or to a small …rm, and thus the bid function of a larger operator 5 In the Inudstrial Organization literature there is a long tradition of price-cost measurement. See for example Rosse (1970) , Bresnahan (1981 Bresnahan ( , 1987 and Nevo (2001) . 6 In what follows we consider that the size of a generator is its capacity.
would coincide with the bid schedule obtained as the sum of the bids of similar plants under the control of small …rms. Of course, in real auctions production units will take into account their e¤ect on other production plants under the same ownership and will respond to their incentive to restrict output and raise prices when calculating their optimal bid schedule. Larger generators are very often marginal bidders at the auction, determining the price that is paid to all plants for all units sold. This impact on equilibrium prices creates an incentive to o¤er plant's bids schedules which are to the left of the equivalent bids of small generators. Our measure of market power is based on this di¤erence in bids between larger and smaller operators at the pool.
It is worth noting that, compared to previous works based on price-cost margin estimates, our method provides a lower bound for that margin. In other words, our competitive benchmark is a situation in which each plant is run independently (and the equilibrium price that would be determined in that case) but, as long as the number of plants is …nite, each plant could bid above marginal cost. 7 This method may be useful whenever cost data are not available.
Our main …ndings for the Spanish pool are that the two larger operators consistently submit bid curves which are to the left (higher prices for every quantity bid) of the competitive benchmark. We also calculate the increase in price-cost margins for peak and o¤-peak hours. These results are somewhat consistent with those of Wolfram (1998) who …nds evidence that in the British market the larger supplier submitted higher bids for similar plants.
Besides market concentration and the electricity auction rules, there are other features of the market which could potentially a¤ect …rms'incentives for price setting. The market is vertically integrated, so that larger generators are also large buyers in this market. This feature might moderate the real incentives for …rms to keep pool prices high. 8 We also examine how regulation concerning stranded costs payments (CTCs) a¤ects bidding behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a very brief description of the Spanish pool. In Section 3 we de…ne a measure of a generator's market power, based on the impact that its bidding has on the equilibrium price: if all the plants of a generator were run independently, we would obtain an equilibrium price; when these plants coordinate their bids, the equilibrium price is higher.
This price di¤erence yields a measure of market power. The rest of the paper presents our empirical results for the Spanish pool. In Section 4 we describe our competitive benchmark and the procedure for measuring each …rm's market power and in Section 5, we show the statistical results. Section 6 concludes.
The Spanish wholesale electricity market
The Spanish pool for electricity (day-ahead market) started its operations in January 1998 organized a s a uniform-price auction. Quali…ed buyers in the pool present purchasing bids. 11 They state a quantity and a price of a power block and there can be as many as 25 power purchasing blocks for the same purchasing unit, with di¤erent prices for each one; the prices must be decreasing. The pool administrator constructs an aggregate demand 1 0 According to the Electricity Market Activity Rules, p. 6, generators "shall be required to submit electric power sale bids to the market operator for each of the production units they own for each and every one of the hourly scheduling periods." There is an exception to this rule when the production unit has a bilateral contract which, due to its characteristics, is excluded from the bidding system. 1 1 >From January 1st 2003, all buyers of electricity are considered quali…ed buyers. Before that date quali…ed buyers were those with consumption greater or equal to 1 GWh per year. The required consumption has decreased over time from 5GWh (December 1998) to 3GWh (April 1999) , to 2GWh (July 1999) and to 1 GWh (October 1999).
with these o¤ers.
In a session of the daily market the pool administrator combines these offers matching demand and supply for each of the 24 hourly periods and determines the equilibrium price for each period (the system marginal price) and the amount traded.
12 This matching is called the base daily operating schedule (PBF). After the base daily operating schedule is settled, the pool administrator evaluates the technical feasibility of the assignment; if the required technical restrictions are met then the program is feasible; if not, some previously accepted o¤ers are eliminated and others included to obtain the provisional feasible daily schedule (PVP). This reassignment ends at 14:00. By 16:00 the …nal feasible daily schedule (PVD) is obtained taking into account the ancillary services assignment procedure. There is also an intra-day market to make any necessary adjustments between demand and supply. 13 The result is called the …nal hourly schedule (PHF).
A measure of market power
Our main interest is to provide a measure of market power independent of cost estimates. The basic idea is to compare the bidding behavior at the auction of players with a large capacity, to the bidding behavior of small players. In the presence of market concentration, most models would predict prices above 1 2 Appendix 1 describes the procedure for calculating the system marginal price when demand and supply intersect in a vertical or horizontal section of either the aggregate demand or the aggregate supply curves.
1 3 The intra-day market started working in April 1998. In the …rst three months it had 2 sessions per day. From July 1998 it had 4 sessions per day and from September 1998 it had 5 sessions. Now it has at least 6 sessions. marginal cost. This is the case when the spot market is modeled as supply function competition (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Green and Newbery, 1992; Bolle, 1992; Green, 1996; Grant and Kahn, 2000) or as Cournot competition (Borenstein and Bushnel, 1997) .
14 The market has also been modelled as a multi-unit auction (Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord, 2002 , von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993 , Wolfram, 1999 ; market power may be also present in equilibrium in these multiunit auction models. 15 García-Castro and Marín (2003) have modeled the Spanish pool (decreasing demand and short-lived bids) using auction theory and obtained equilibria in pure strategies with prices above marginal cost. Thus, even though the results of the existing models di¤er, they all capture the same phenomenon: the higher incentives of large generators to restrict output as compared to the incentives of smaller generators. Based on this di¤erence we derive an index of market power which is a lower bound for the Lerner index. Then we will measure such an index with Spanish pool data and test for di¤erences in bidding behavior.
The standard measure of market power is the Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) :
p , where c is marginal cost. In this section we propose a measure of market power which is a lower bound for the Lerner index. Thus, if we …nd that market power is signi…cant according to our index, we can be sure that p c p is also signi…cant. The measure is based on the comparison of a generator's behavior, referred to a particular production unit, to the behavior of a generator who owns only one production unit. If a plant from a larger generator were to bid the same bid curve as a plant from a generator with only one plant, then it would not be using its market power associated with size. However, we would expect a larger generator to instruct its plants to restrict output, submitting bid schedules to the left. Any di¤erence between the two bid curves will be attributed here to market power and the impact on equilibrium prices will be used to construct a measure of individual market power.
More precisely, for a generator i with m plants we de…ne a synthetic generator i as a generator which does not maximize joint pro…ts for the m plants, rather it instructs each plant to present a bid curve at the pool so as to maximize the plant's pro…ts. In other words, a synthetic generator does not internalize the e¤ects of its plants on each other's pro…ts, i.e. it does not fully exploit its market power. Our measure of market power is based on the comparison of a generator's equilibrium behavior, referred to a particular production unit, to the equilibrium behavior of a generator who owns only one production unit.
Denote S i the bid schedule of generator i, obtained from the sum of all its plants'bid schedules,
Similarly, we denote S Denote D t (p) the demand function and p t the equilibrium price at the pool at time t. This price is the market clearing price so that
if we replace generator i's bid schedule by synthetic generator i's bid, S s i (p), the equilibrium price would be di¤erent: di¤erence between the market clearing prices p t and p is t is a measure of producer i's market power, its ability to raise prices.
If we replace the bid schedules from several generators we get a measure of joint market power. Denoting p Is t the market clearing price at time t after replacing the bid schedule of producers in set I by their synthetic bid, i.e. Our measure of market power of generator i's is then: measures, is that it shows the contribution of asymmetric …rms to the price-cost margin.
The measure should be interpreted as "sellers e¤ective market power," that is, the extent to which a seller is having an upward e¤ect on price. In empirical applications we may …nd …rms with a large market share in generation but exerting a low impact on prices due to the presence of contracts for di¤erences, vertical integration or regulation.
Measuring market power in the Spanish pool
We want to examine the e¤ect of each …rm´s market power. The competitive benchmark is the bidding behavior at the pool of a generator who does not exercise any market power. Larger generators present bids for each unit that maximize joint pro…ts for the …rm. At the same auction, there are small generators with units of similar characteristics. We approximate the competitive behavior for a larger generator using the bids at the same auction of small gen- we choose a plant using the same technology under the ownership of a small generator, plant S, and with a similar capacity. We compute a capacity coef…cient dividing the capacity of plant L over the capacity of plant S:
We multiply the quantities in the bid by …rm S by the coe¢ cient
, so as to get a 'scaled bid'. We replace the bid by plant L by the 'scaled bid' by plant S. 
Results
The data consists of hourly demand and supply bids for each agent and for each production and demand unit, in the day-ahead electricity wholesale market, 
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We have computed the following time series: the market clearing prices, the synthetic prices obtained by replacing EN's bids by its synthetic bids, the synthetic prices obtained by replacing IB's bids by the synthetic bids, and …nally the synthetic prices obtained by replacing both EN's bids and IB's bids by their respective synthetic bids: (IB s +EN s ) prices. Since the bids from nuclear plants are never the marginal bids at the auction, it is reasonable to think that 1 7 Peak demand hours: From 16:00 to 22:00 week days (excluding holidays) in November, December, January, and February. From 9:00 to 15:00 week days in March, April, July, and October. O¤-peak 1 demand hours: From 0:00 to 8:00 every day of the year, plus Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. August is also included. O¤-peak 2 demand hours: From 6:00 to 16:00 and from 22:00 to 00:00, week days in November, December, January, and February. From 8:00 to 9:00, and from 15:00 to 00:00, week days in March, April, July, and October. >From 8:00 to 00:00 week days in May, June, and September. plants with this technology are not being used strategically. Nevertheless, we tested whether the nuclear synthetic bids were di¤erent from the actual bids from nuclear plants. The data indicate that they are not statistically di¤erent, so that in the case of nuclear energy we have kept the actual bids instead of replacing them by the synthetic bids.
The supply bids at the auction sometimes include restrictions that may be binding. 18 When that is the case, those bids are not included in the …nal assignment by the market operator, OMEL. Since these restrictions cannot be replicated for the synthetic bids we have decided to ignore them. Ignoring those restrictions sometimes causes our market clearing prices to be lower than the price made public by the market operator. Since the complex conditions on the supply bids are ignored both for the actual and the synthetic plants, there is no reason to think that this procedure is introducing any bias in the measurement of market power.
On the other hand, the market operator sometimes rejects demand bids at a high price because they are unfeasible given the capacity restrictions of the interconnections with the neighbor countries. In those cases, there is a rationing procedure to assign the interconnection capacity among bidders. This reduction on demand sometimes causes our market clearing price to be higher than the price published by OMEL. Again, these capacity limits are ignored both for the synthetic bids and for the actual ones so that no bias is introduced.
We present a test of unconditional means. The null is that market power is zero, so that market clearing prices are equal to synthetic equilibrium prices.
We test this hypothesis for each of the larger …rms and we also test whether joint market power is zero.
Results are reported in Table 1 . We run the test considering all the observations, peak demand hours, o¤-peak 2 demand hours (intermediate demand levels), and o¤-peak 1 hours (low demand), for each of the hypotheses to be tested. The weighted average market power indexes are According to these results, the behavior of the two larger …rms at the auction has increased prices jointly by 25% and IB's bidding behavior is responsible for a much larger increase than EN's. This is in contrast witht the fact that EN has a higher market share and higher capacity than IB.
This di¤erence between the two larger …rms could be explained by several factors. The electricity market is vertically integrated so that EN and IB own …rms on the demand side. Hence, their incentives to raise prices could be de- is very likely to be the driving force behind the bidding behavior at the pool.
The right to collect these payments for the recovery of stranded costs is lost (or partially lost) if the …nal weighted average price perceived by the generators goes above a reference price (3.606ce/kWh).
21 Generators'incentives di¤er depending on each …rm's entitlement to these CTCs' payments. A …rm with a high percentage of these payments to recover has a lower incentive to increase 2 1 Several authors have pointed out this e¤ect of CTCs; see, for example, Lasheras (1998) and García Martín (2001) . IB and Gas Natural have declared that CTCs are behind EN bidding behavior (El Correo Digital, July 29, 2004) the pool price. The percentages for 2001 were are as follows: EN: 50.36%; IB: 24.63%; UF: 13.29%; HC: 6.35%; Elcogás: 3.45% and Viesgo:1.92%. Thus, IB, with a relatively low share of CTCs compared to its market share has a stronger incentive to restrict output. This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented here.
Conclusions
We have compared the bidding behavior at the pool of technologically similar plants, ones under the ownership of larger generators and the others under the ownership of smaller …rms. Any systematic di¤erence in their bid schedules could be attributed to the market power of larger generators. We have observed this di¤erent behavior in terms of bidding curves at the pool and measured the impact on equilibrium prices.
There are di¤erences in bidding behavior between larger and smaller generators in the Spanish wholesale market. Given that demand is very inelastic and supply highly concentrated, larger generators would be able to increase prices by a considerable amount. There are however, mitigating forces for this potential market power. Vertical integration may alter the incentives to raise prices since generators are also important buyers at the pool. However, vertical integration alone does not seem to explain why IB has a higher price cost margin than EN.
Regulation concerning the recovery of stranded costs (CTCs) provides incentives not to raise prices above a reference price set by the regulator. Further-more, it provides di¤erent incentives for di¤erent generators, depending on their share on the CTCs payments. This is consistent with the empirical evidence concerning the bidding behavior of the two larger generators at the pool.
The possibility of collusion has been ignored. It is possible that part of the market power that we measure in this paper is due to the repetition of the auction, which would allow …rms to sustain outcomes which are more cooperative than the one-shot outcome. It is di¢ cult to empirically distinguish between the impact of collusion and the e¤ect of 'static' market power. The analysis of collusion would require further work and is left for future research. Other important issues omitted include capacity choice (see Castro, Marín and Siotis (2001) . Finally, an interesting question will be the analysis of the changes in bidding behavior after the introduction of the Iberian market (MIBEL).
Appendix 1. The system marginal price
The equilibrium price is the price obtained from the intersection of aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves. At the Spanish pool that price is calculated as follows (see OMEL's Electricity Market Activity Rules):
The marginal price shall correspond to the price of the last block of electric power supply o¤ered for sale submitted by the last production unit whose acceptance was necessary to satisfy the matched demand. The market operator shall accept, at the marginal price, the total electric power o¤ered in those sale bids whose prices are below the marginal price. The market operator shall accept, at the marginal price, the total electric power demanded by buyers in all the electric power purchase bids whose maximum prices are above the marginal price, except in cases where there is not enough electric power at prices that are lower than or equal to the marginal price to satisfy the demand that incorporates prices that are higher than the marginal price.
If there is excess supply at the marginal price, it shall be proportionately deducted from the sales of those units whose price is equal to the marginal price. If there is excess demand at the marginal price, it shall be proportionately deducted from the quantities of electric power included in the blocks of those purchase bids whose price is equal to the price of the last accepted purchase bid.
When demand and supply cross in a vertical section of the supply curve, according to these rules the marginal price is lower than the market clearing price.
We consider the electricity market auction on June 28th, 2001, at 18:00 hours. Puentes Garcia Rodriguez 2 (Code PGR2), is a generation unit that belongs to Endesa (EN). It uses lignite and imported coal as input. The plant which is closest in technical characteristics is Meirama 1, (code MEI1), which belongs to Unión Fenosa (UF). Table 5 below shows the way we build the Synthetic PGR2, PGR2
S . The …rst column is the block number corresponding to the plants bids. Column 2 is the price bid, column 3 is the quantity bid and column 4 gives the points (price,quantity) in the bid schedule. In the synthetic PGR2 there are as many blocks as in MEI1 (that is, two in this example) and the quantities are proportinal to the capacity of PGR2. 
